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DAMAGES-SIX PERCENT INTEREST RATE TO REDUCE
FUTURE DAMAGES TO PRESENT WORTH-FUTURE
LOSS CALCULATIONS ADMISSIBLE INTO
EVIDENCE
Brodie v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 415 Pa. 296, 203 A.2d 657 (1964)
Plaintiff, a guest passenger in an automobile operated by Sylvia Waxier,
instituted suit against the Philadelphia Transportation Company for injuries
sustained as result of a collision between defendant's trolley car and the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger. It was alleged that the collision and
resulting injuries were due to the negligent operation of the car. Subsequently,
the plaintiff died from said injuries and proper substitution of a personal
representative as a party plaintiff was made. The investigating police officer
as the defendant's witness was allowed on cross-examination to give certain
opinion testimony. He stated that the trolley car was traveling at a rate of
thirty-five miles per hour which was too fast for conditions, and that it was
not under control. In addition, plaintiff offered into evidence the testimony
of an actuarial expert to explain the present worth of the deceased's future
earnings. His calculations were based upon six and four percent interest rates.
The trial court returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, reversed
and a new trial ordered. Both the admission of the police officer's testimony
and the use of both a six and four percent interest rate constituted error in
Brodie v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 415 Pa. 296, 203 A.2d 657 (1964).
The court readily found the admission of the police officer's testimony
prejudicial error on two counts: (1) the cross examination went beyond the
scope of the direct examination; (2) the officer's opinion as expressed "was
grossly speculative and an invasion of the jury's exclusive prerogative."'
The court next directed its attention to the issue of the interest rate to be
used to reduce future damages to their present worth. The existing Pennsylvania law applies "the lawful rate of six percent only."'2 The rationale underlying the application of "lawful rate" is based on the uncertainty of future
interest rates, for without a fixed rule there would be "confusion and chaos."'
1. 415 Pa. at
2. Id. at 300,
Scaffolds Co., 409
3. Id. at 585,

297, 203 A.2d at 658.
203 A.2d at 659. (Emphasis added.) See Gregorius v. Safeway Steel
Pa. 578, 187 A.2d 646 (1963).
187 A.2d at 650.
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However, Justice Roberts disagreed with the court's use of a fixed six
percent rate.4 He believed that a six percent interest return was not commonly available for these particular funds; instead, the prevailing interest
rate should be employed as could be established by proof.
Many jurisdictions have adopted a rule consistent with Justice Roberts:
reasoning. 5 This rule, "the reasonable rate of interest rule," is based on a
determination by the trier of fact of the rate of return "which persons with'6
out financial skill could safely secure on their investment." Under this rule,
evidence is presented as to the present worth of future earnings based on
several different probable interest rates on investments, and used as a guide
in arriving at a present value. The plaintiff's actual expected return, then, can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
Although there is uncertainty as to the precise rate of return the plaintiff will be able to obtain, it is reasonably certain that a six percent return
upon these funds is highly unlikely. 7 Thus, to use only this fixed rate will
not give the plaintiff the actual present worth of future damages.
The court was also confronted with another question-the admissibility
of present worth calculations into evidence. The specific problem was, that
these calculations do not take into consideration such factors as the plaintiff's health and the decline in earning power with advancing age, and, therefore, it is possible that they may be misused by the jury, i.e., used as annuity tables.' The court decided, however, that it would be more enlightening
to the jury to have the calculations so presented in evidence by an expert, for
the computations required to reduce future earnings to present worth are
beyond the average juror's ability. 9 Thus, without these calculations, the
jury has nothing on which to base its valuation. Actually, the court was
following McKinney v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 10 where the court also approved
the use of concrete illustrations of present worth tables.
4. 415 Pa. at 303, 203 A.2d at 660 (dissenting opinion).
5. E.g., Chesapeake & 0. R.R. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916); Von Tersch v.
Ahrendson, 251 Iowa 115, 99 N.W.2d 287 (1959) ; Renuart Lumber Yards v. Levine, 49
So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1950). See McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 86 (1935); OLECK, DAMAGES TO
PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 966.25-.28 (1961).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 924, comment d at 635 (1939) provides:
In ascertaining the present worth of earnings, that is, in discounting the recovery
because future losses are paid for in advance, the rate of discount is based upon
the current return upon long-term investments if the prospective losses are long
continued. (Emphasis added.)
6. O'Conner v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 585 (2d Cir. 1959).
7. See Gregorius v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 409 Pa. 578, 187 A.2d 646 (1963)
(dissenting opinion).

8. See McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 572-73, 132 Atl. 810, 814 (1926).
9. 415 Pa. at 301, 203 A.2d at 659.
10. 363 Pa. 368, 69 A.2d 83 (1949).
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The use of these calculations, however, is qualified by the use of proper
instructions in charging the jury.
We hasten to caution trial courts that adequate and careful instructions in the use of such evidence should be given to the jury.
It should be pointed out that such evidence is not conclusive but
merely an aid to assist them in determining the present value of any
future damages . . . that there is a marked difference between life
expectancy and work expectancy; that the health, habits and occupation of the person involved are important factors in determining his
life work expectancy, as well as his expected life span; that a person's earnings may cease or be curtailed by illness, accident or other
causes aside from death, and that with increased age earnings, in
most instances, also decline. In survival actions, the jury should also
be instructed, that where recovery is given for the probable future
earnings of the decedent's work expectancy, the total sum of such
earnings must first be reduced by subtracting therefrom, that portion
thereof which the decedent would have provided for his wife and
children, and also by diminishing therefrom that portion thereof
which he probably would have used for his own maintenance during
the period involved."
As a result of Brodie, Pennsylvania follows the majority in allowing
present worth tables to be admitted into evidence subject to the above charge.
The jury is permitted to receive evidence to accurately determine the present
worth of future damages. Yet, this decision denies the jury the right to use
this evidence to best determine the actual present value of future damages by
2
allowing only a six percent rate to be used.'
While this use of the six percent rate provides the court with a tool to
facilitate the handling of such damages, it completely disregards the existing
market conditions relating to the particular funds in question. Quite possibly
the actual present worth may be considerably less than six percent, in which
case, the plaintiff is deprived of damages which should be part of his compensation.
THOMAS K. HENDERSON
11. 415 Pa. at 302-03, 203 A.2d at 659-60. See Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411
Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963).
12. See Murray v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948)
(dissenting opinion), wherein it was stated:
I cannot see any logical connection whatever between the maximum rate of
interest which the law allows a creditor to charge and the amount of return
It seems to me
which an investor can obtain on reasonably safe securities ....
obvious that the discount computed should be made in accordance with the actual
earning power of money, namely, the current rate of return on sound investment.
Id. at 79, 58 A.2d at 328.

SUSPENSION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
BENEFITS BASED ON ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES
Symons v. National Elec. Prods., Inc., 414 Pa. 505, 200 A.2d 871 (1964)
In 1952 claimant suffered a compound fracture of both legs, which injury resulted in the amputation of both legs at points above the knees. A
compensation agreement, executed one week after the accident, provided for
payment of the then maximum compensation of thirty dollars per week.
Claimant's participation in a remarkable rehabilitation program enabled him
to return to work for the same employer in 1954 without a loss of wages.
By September, 1957, claimant's earnings exceeded the wages being paid
to him at the time of the accident. The employer, therefore, sought to suspend
further compensation. The Workmen's Compensation Board found that
the claimant had been successfully rehabilitated and was not totally disabled.
Compensation payments were therefore suspended on November 23, 1960.
In Symons v. National Elec. Prods., Inc.' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the superior court's holding that the Workmen's Compensation
Board was authorized to find that the loss of both legs did not per se entitle
a claimant to compensation for total disability and furthermore, that the
Board had properly ordered the suspension of compensation benefits until such
time as the disability was reflected in loss of earning power.
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, section 306 (c),
provides:
For all disability resulting from permanent injuries of the following
classes, the compensation shall be exclusively as follows:
...Unless the Board shall otherwise determine, the loss of ...
both legs . . . shall constitute permanent, total disability to be compensated according to provisions of clause (a) .2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, according to the above statutory directive,
stated that it is the Board's role to determine whether the loss of both legs
results in total disability and upon such determination to declare whether compensation for total disability will follow.This determination should be based
solely on the evidence presented. The statute vests discretion in the Board
and its determination should be based solely on the evidence presented.
In the principal case, the claimant had been working full time as an inspector and earning wages substantially higher than those earned at the
time of his accident. Therefore, the claimant was not economically disabled.
1. 414 Pa. 505, 200 A.2d 871 (1964).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 513 (23)

2.

(Supp. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
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However, the crucial question remains 'whether total disability is essentially
economic, or whether the physical factor is to be considered the primary one
in determining compensation.
In a similar case, Shoop v. Chambersburg Baking Co., 3 a 1959 decision,
the court concluded that the proper test of total disability under section
306(c) was physical disability rather than economic disability. The court
held that a claimant who had lost both legs in an industrial accident could
not be denied compensation for total disability even though he had subsequently secured employment which provided a greater rate of compensation
than that which he earned before the accident. However, the court did recognize that the Board has the discretionary power to determine whether an
employee who loses both legs is totally disabled.
As early as 1922, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Lente v. Luci 4 held
that section 306(c) provides compensation for the loss of a member, and that
the degree of disability which may result therefrom is immaterial. The court
recognized in Kerwin v. American Ry. Express Co.5 that the economic consequences of a workman's injury under section 306(c) have no bearing on
his right to compensation for that injury.
The compensation provided for under the provisions of the Act is
for the injury sustained. While loss of earning power may be evidence tending to show the extent of injuries, the mere fact that earning power has not decreased will not prevent recovery for injuries
actually sustained. If an injury results in amputation of an arm or
a leg compensation for such a loss cannot be avoided by showing such
victim's ability to earn as much in another occupation not requiring
the use of the missing member."
The Kerwin doctrine was affirmed in Ciotti v. Jareck Mfg. Co. 7 Here the
superior court held that the extent of the economic disability is immaterial in
the determination of the amount of compensation payable for a specific injury under section 306(c). The extent of the injury suffered is the only
relevant factor. 8
In a recent decision, Zimmerman v. Pennsylvania Farm Bureau Co-op.
Ass'n,9 the court held that a claimant who had lost the use of both eyes was
"totally disabled" within the meaning of the act. His resumption of gain3. 189 Pa. Super. 20, 149 A.2d 179 (1959).
4. 275 Pa. 217, 119 Atl. 132 (1922).
5. 273 Pa. 134, 116 Atl. 655 (1955).
6. Id. at 137, 116 Atl. at 656.
7. 128 Pa. Super. 233, 193 Atl. 323 (1937).
8. See also Morrow v. J. S. Murray and Sons, 136 Pa. Super. 277, 2 A.2d 109
(1939). The fact that an employee resumed work at the same rate of pay received before
his accident did not bar an award for the permanent loss of a member.
9. 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 245 (1958).
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ful employment did not affect his right to receive compensation payments for
total disability. The court felt that the legislature did not intend to penalize
him because he had the industry and ambition to find employment.', Zimmerman is in accord with Shoop in that the proper test for total disability is
physical disability rather than economic disability.
The situation proposed by the supreme court in Kerwin has come to the
foreground in the principal case. Yet, the court upheld the Board's determination that compensation for loss of claimant's legs was to be determined in
light of the fact that he had the ability to earn higher wages than those earned
before the accident. It is submitted that the Board should not determine compensation by relying solely on economic consequences. In view of the cases
discussed above it was improper for the Board to justify the termination of
the claimant's compensation payments solely on economic grounds." It would
seem that this decision would discourage a worker, handicapped by an industrial accident, from seeking employment. The knowledge that gainful employment will result in termination of compensation payments would discourage the worker from accepting a job. This result is inconsistent with
the strong public policy of utilizing to the fullest extent our industrial resources, one of the most important of these being the workingman.
The Workmen's Compensation Act enacted in 1937 is essentially a
humanitarian measure.' 2 It would seem that the instant case does not comply
with the underlying social policies of the act in that wages do not constitute
an accurate indication of total disability. Accordingly, the dissenting judges in
Symons said: "The earnings of the claimant in deciding whether the claimant
is or is not totally disabled is too rigid a construction to place on an act that
requires a liberal interpretation."'1 The use of the Board's discretionary
power in this case, therefore, is to be questioned. Its unsatisfactory attempt to
apply this humanitarian law may underline the need for legislation to remove
the discretionary power from the Board, or in the alternative, legislation designed to specifically encompass physical as well as economic factors which
the Board can then use in determining the question of disability.
IRA

H.

WEINSTOCK

10. Id. at 253.
11. The Board ruled that the claimant was no longer permanently disabled, because
he had been able to obtain employment at wages substantially higher than those earned
at the time of the accident.
12. See Dupree v. Barney, 193 Pa. Super. 331, 163 A.2d 901 (1960).
13. 414 Pa. at 518, 200 A.2d at 878.

JURISDICTION OF COURTS-COMMON
ORPHANS' COURT

PLEAS OR

Ellis v. Ellis, 415 Pa. 412, 203 A.2d 547 (1964)
Prior to his death on September 1, 1961, Abraham M. Ellis and his
three sons were equal business partners under an oral partnership agreement.
Abraham appointed these three sons, a daughter and his attorney as coexecutors of his estate, and thereby each son was placed in the dual fiduciary
capacity of a partner and executor. Animosity developed between the sons,
resulting in two of them, appellees, filing a bill in equity in common pleas
court in Philadelphia. The bill petitioned the court to enter a decree which
would dissolve the partnership and cause a supervised sale of the partnership's assets. The proposed sale was to restrict the bidding to the partners
themselves. The third son, appellant, filed preliminary objections to the bill
in his individual capacity and as co-executor. His objections challenged the
jurisdiction of the common pleas court to direct such a sale, and in the alternative alleged that if the common pleas court did have jurisdiction, prior
approval of the orphans' court was necessary to permit any of the co-executors
to bid or purchase in his individual capacity at the sale of the partnership's
assets.
The common pleas court held that jurisdiction over the winding up of a
dissolved partnership lies entirely within the common pleas court, regardless
of the fact that surviving partners are also co-executors of a deceased partner's estate. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.
The preliminary objections to the bill first contended that the proposed
sale of the partnership's assets was a distribution of an asset of the deceased
partner's estate and, therefore, came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
orphans' court.' The court said this contention was fallacious because the
specific partnership property of an individual partner remains in the partnership on his death and is not property of his estate. This conclusion is sup2
ported by the language and policy of the Uniform Partnership Act.
The dissolution 3 of a partnership occurs by operation of law upon the
death of any partner. 4 Therefore, in this case there was no need for a court
decreed dissolution. Nevertheless, upon ". . . dissolution the partnership is
1.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,

§ 2080.301(1)

(1951) provides that "the orphans' court

shall have exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) The administration and distribution of the real
and personal property of decedents' estates. .. "
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1-105 (1915).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 91 (1915) provides that "the dissolution of a partnership
is the change in relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated
in the carrying on, as distinguished from the winding up, of the business."
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 93(4) (1915) provides that "dissolution is caused:
(4) By the death of a partner."
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not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is
completed." 5 The right and duty to wind-up the affairs of the partnership lies
with the surviving partner or partners," and upon the death of a partner his
right in specific partnership property 7

".

.

. vests in the surviving partner

or partners." Therefore, the estate of the deceased partner acquires no right
to specific partnership property, as it is vested in the partnership. The function
of winding up the affairs of the partnership is purely an internal one, and in
this respect the partnership is treated as an entity.9 Thus, the only right afforded the deceased partner's estate is a right as a creditor of the partnership
after the value of the deceased partner's interest in the partnership has been
ascertained by the surviving partner or partners.' 0 It follows that, if the estate of the deceased partner has no property interest in the partnership until
the value of the deceased partner's share is ascertained, then the orphans'
court has no jurisdiction over this purely internal partnership matter. The
exclusive jurisdiction lies in common pleas court."
The appellant's preliminary objections next contended, that prior orphans'
court approval was necessary, as provided in section 546 of the Fiduciaries
Act. 12 However, this section of the Fiduciaries Act is applicable solely to
property of the estate, and, therefore, is not relevant in this case under the
reasoning discussed above. The proposed sale is of the assets of the partnership, and at this point in the proceedings the estate has no property rights
in these assets.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 92 (1915). See Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131
Atl. 276 (1925).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 99 (1915) provides that "unless otherwise agreed the
partners who have not wrongfully dissolved the partnership . . . [have] the right to
wind up the partnership affairs ... "
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 71(1) (1915) provides that "the property rights of a
partner are (1) his rights in specific partnership property.
...
This section provides
for two additional property rights belonging to partners which do not concern the disposition of the instant case.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 72(2) (d) (1915).
9. The Uniform Partnership Act rejects the theory of a partnership being an entity
distinct from the individuals composing it and defines a partnership as being ". . . an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 11(1) (1915). However, the partnership ". . . as a matter
of fact, is treated by a legal fiction as a quasi person or entity for such purposes as
keeping of partnership accounts and marshalling assets." Morrison's Estate, 343 Pa. 157,
162, 22 A.2d 729, 732 (1941).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 104 (1915). The personal representative of a deceased'
partner's estate may apply to the common pleas court upon cause shown to have the
affairs of the partnership wound up by the court. PA. STAT. ANN. 59, § 99 (1915).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 284 (1841) provides that "the . . . courts of common
pleas, within this commonwealth, shall have all the powers and jurisdiction of courts of
chancery in settling partnership accounts and claims ..
" (Emphasis added.)
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.546 (1949) provides that ". . . [the] personal
representative, in his individual capacity, may bid for [or] purchase . . . real or personal
property belonging to the estate, subject, however, to the approval of the [orphans']
court .. "
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It seems that the case is sound in its reasoning and result; however,
it may leave many perplexing issues unsolved. Each of the three sons, being
surviving partners, occupies the position of a fiduciary in winding up the
affairs of the partnership.' 3 It would seem that under these circumstances the
court would be reluctant to permit a sale restricted to the partners themselves. 14 There is also the question of whether a court of common pleas,
sitting in equity, can decree such a sale where one of the three surviving
partners objects.' 5 A further question may arise, if the sale is permitted, as
6
to the effect of the sale on the valuation of the deceased partner's interest.'
A final problem arises in this case because of the unusual positions
occupied by each of the three sons. They are fiduciaries as partners, owing a
duty to partnership. As co-executors they are fiduciaries, owing a duty to
decedent's estate. Finally, they represent themselves in their individual
capacity with regard to the partnership, and it is quite possible that they may
be devisees or legatees under their father's will. These various positions could
create conflicts of interest. It is conceivable that in fulfilling their legal duty
as fiduciaries to the partnership, they may assess a value on the deceased
partner's interest that is unacceptable to them in the performance of their
duty as co-executors of the decedent's estate. Here, the conflict of interest is
patent. If as co-executors they used the remedy of surcharge against the
surviving partners, as is suggested by the majority,' 7 they in effect would be
suing themselves.
Chief Justice Bell, in his partial dissent, points to the unusual circumstances of the case as giving rise to a conflict of interest with regard to the
proposed sale of the partnership's assets.' 8 He concludes that the prior approval of the orphans' court should be secured because of this conflict. It is
submitted that this conflict of interest does not result from the position oc13. Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 Atd. 276 (1925) ; Lee v. Dahlin, 399 Pa. 50,
159 A.2d 679 (1960).
14. ". . . [T]hey [plaintiffs] asked the Court to restrict the sale to the partners
themselves-a prayer which it is difficult to imagine any court would order or approve."
Ellis v. Ellis, 415 Pa. 412, 419, 203 A.2d 547, 552 (1964) (Chief Justice Bell partial
dissent).
15. It would appear that the only available method would be the appointing of a
receiver to sell the assets. This rests in the discretion of the court. Moffit v. Peirce, 344
Pa. 16, 24 A.2d 448 (1942).

16. The Uniform Partnership Act does not provide a procedure for valuing the
interest of a partner in the partnership except to require that the valuation be determined
as of the date of dissolution. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 104 (1915). However, it would
appear that since the proposed sale in this case would take place more than three years
after the dissolution date, it would have no effect on the valuation of the deceased
partner's interest. Hay's Appeal, 91 Pa. 265 (1879) ; Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131
Atl. 276 (1925).
17. Ellis v. Ellis, 415 Pa. 412, 419, 203 A.2d 547, 552 (1964).
18. Id. at 422, 203 A.2d at 553.
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cupied by the sons as co-executors of the deceased partner's estate, but rather
from their capacity as fiduciaries to the partnership. They seek to purchase
the assets of the partnership at a sale which is restricted to the partners. This,
in essence, would permit them to purchase the assets in their individual
capacity from themselves in their capacity as fiduciaries of the partnership.
Again, the conflict of interest is patent; but it is one solely related to the
partnership. It should in no way affect the estate because the valuation of the
deceased partner's interest is determined as of the date of the partnership's
dissolution,' 9 which occurred at his death. 20 The proposed sale would necessarily have to occur some three years after the date of dissolution. 21 Thus,
the sale price should have no effect on the valuation of the decedent's interest.2 It follows, therefore, that since the estate would not be affected by
the proposed sale, there is no necessity to secure the prior approval of the
orphans' court.
BERTRAM

19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 91 (1915).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 93(4) (1915).
21. Abraham M. Ellis died September 1, 1961.
22. See note 16 supra.
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